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DOES THE NCAA'S FOOTBALL RULE 9-2
IMPEDE THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
ON THE PLAYING FIELD?
I. INTRODUCTION
"I feel it's my right and it's my opportunity to give thanks to
God," said quarterback Antwan Chiles, who kneels in the end
zone after running touchdowns. "I want the kids across America
to look at me and know that I have a higher power, and that's
God."
Unfortunately, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") does
not agree with Mr. Chiles, a football player at the religiously based Liberty
University in Virginia.
One of the purposes of the NCAA, as set forth in its constitution, is
"[t]o legislate, through bylaws or by resolution of a Convention, upon any
subject of general concern to the members related to the administration of
intercollegiate athletics."'2 The NCAA decided that one subject worthy of
discussion was the unsportsmanlike conduct occurring during college
football games. In response to this concern, the NCAA drafted Football
rule 9-2 ("rule 9-2").3 Although rule 9-2 was originally adopted in 1992,
1. David Reed, Gridiron Celebration: NCAA Rules Post-TD Prayers OK, PHOENIX
GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 1995, at A-I, A-6.
2. NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.2(h), reprinted in 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL.
3. NCAA Football rule 9-2 provides:
Section 2. Noncontact Fouls
Unsportsmanlike Acts
ARTICLE 1: There shall be no unsportsmanlike conduct or any act that interferes
with orderly game administration on the part of the players, substitutes, coaches,
authorized attendants or any other persons subject to the rules, before the game,
during the game or between periods.
a. Specifically prohibited acts and conduct include:
1. No player, substitute, coach or other person subject to
the rules shall use obscene or vulgar language or
gestures or engage in acts that provoke ill will or are
demeaning to an opponent, to game officials or to the
image of the game, including:
(a) Pointing the finger(s), hand(s), arm(s) or
ball at an opponent.
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(b) Baiting or insulting an opponent verbal-
ly.
(c) Inciting an opponent or spectators in any
other way.
(d) Any delayed, excessive or prolonged act
by which a player attempts to focus
attention upon himself.
(e) Removal of a player's helmet before he
is in the team area (Exceptions: Team,
media or injury timeouts; equipment
adjustment; through play; and between
periods).
2. No person subject to the rules, except players, officials
and eligible substitutes, shall be on the field of play or
end zones during any period without permission from
the referee. If a player is injured, attendants may come
inbounds to attend him, but they must obtain recogni-
tion from an official.
3. After a score or any other play, the player in posses-
sion immediately must return the ball to an official or
leave it near the dead-ball spot. This prohibits:
(a) Kicking or throwing the ball any distance
that requires an official to retrieve it.
(b) Spiking the ball to the ground [Exce-
ption: A forward pass to conserve time
(rule 7-3-2-e)].
(c) Throwing the ball high into the air.
(d) Any other unsportsmanlike act or actions
that delay the game.
4. No substitutes may enter the field of play or end zones
for purposes other than replacing a player(s) or to fill
a player(s) vacancy(ies). This includes demonstrations
after any play (A.R. 9-2-1-I).
5. Persons subject to the rules, including bands, shall not
create any noise that prohibits a team from hearing its
signals.
PENALTY- 15 yards [S7, S27] from the succeeding
spot. Penalize as a dead-ball foul.
Flagrant offenders, if players or
substitutes, shall be disqualified [S47].
If a player commits two unsportsmanlike
fouls in the same game, he shall be
disqualified.
b. Other prohibited acts include:
1. During the game, coaches, substitutes and authorized
attendants in the team area shall not be on the field of
play or outside the 25-yard lines without permission
from the referee unless legally entering or leaving the
field (Exceptions: Rules 1-2-4-g and 3-3-8-c).
2. No disqualified player shall enter the field.
PENALTY- 15 yards [S7, S27] from the succeeding
spot. Penalize as a dead-ball foul.
Flagrant offenders, if players or
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it was not until the 1995 season that the athletic organization decided to
strictly enforce the rule. The heightened enforcement policy is an attempt
to increase proper and acceptable conduct on the football field. The NCAA
also created a videotape, which provides more detailed explanations of the
appropriate interpretations of the rule.4 This video serves as a companion
and a supplemental aid to understanding the rule, and was sent to all of the
NCAA's member institutions as well as the organization officials.
The NCAA clearly overstepped its bounds by severely restricting
religious practices with the adoption of rule 9-2. This rule, as interpreted
by the Football Rules Committee and explained in the video, proscribes
many religious expressions. The rule eliminates religious displays by
players, including: crossing themselves, kneeling, and removing their
helmet in the end zone following a touchdown.5 A demonstration of
religious practices will result in a fifteen yard penalty against the offending
team on the next play.6 In addition, the second violation by a player
during a single game results in that player's ejection from the game.7
A college football player whose religious practices and beliefs form
an integral part of his life has a right not to be penalized because of his
religion.8 Under rule 9-2, religious players who openly or demonstratively
give thanks or ask for help from a higher source are singled out and
instructed how and when to pray.9 If these players fail to follow the
NCAA guidelines as to when prayer is appropriate, they may find
themselves sidelined for the duration of the game. Rule 9-2 clearly burdens
a football player's right to the free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. The application of rule 9-2 should be re-examined because
it not only violates the United States Constitution,0 but also the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993," as well as Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.'2
substitutes, shall be disqualified. [S47]
[hereinafter rule 9-2].
4. Videotape, College Football: A Celebration of Teamwork (NCAA Prod. 1995) (on file
wth the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
5. Editorial, Touchdowns and Prayer, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 4, 1995.
6. Id.
7. Rule 9-2, supra note 3, at § (a) Penalty section.
8. Liberty Univ. v. NCAA, No. 95-0046-L, at 1-2, (W.D. Va. filed Aug. 31, 1995),
(dismissed Sept. 1. 1995).
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
11. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
19963
448 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
This Comment addresses the impact of rule 9-2 on the freedom to
practice religion. Part II summarizes the history and structure of the
NCAA. Part III analyzes the implications of rule 9-2. Part IV presents an
in-court challenge to the rule, and Part V considers the status of the NCAA
as a state actor. Part VI discusses the proper standard of review for
intrusions upon religious freedom, and Part VII examines the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Part VIII concludes that the NCAA
should modify its application of rule 9-2 so that it no longer interferes with
religious freedom. The author argues that this rule is not only unconstitu-
tional and illegal, but also exemplifies the NCAA's unwieldy power.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding that the NCAA is not a state actor
and therefore not subject to constitutional restraints, adherence to this
holding is simply not equitable.
II. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
AND ITS ASCENSION TO POWER
The NCAA was founded in 1906 as the governing body of its member
institutions and student athletes.' 3 At that time, the entire association
consisted of sixty-two universities and colleges.'" It has since grown to
include more than 1150 institutions, including public and private colleges
and universities, athletic conferences, athletic associations, and other groups
related to intercollegiate athletics. 5 The NCAA has adopted rules which
govern the conduct of each school's intercollegiate athletic program. 6
Each member of the NCAA must comply with, and enforce, the rules and
regulations of the NCAA.
17
Although several of the NCAA's rules and procedures have been
challenged in recent years, courts have consistently upheld the NCAA's
right to develop and monitor its own program.' 8 According to Justice
13. Pamphlet, NCAA 10100, Nov. 1994, at 7.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2; see also NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Nev. 1992), aft'd, 10
F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994).
16. 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2 (a bound book consisting of over 500 pages
detailing the constitution, bylaws, and additional legislation).
17. NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.2, reprinted in 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL ("Member
institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation ...."); NCAA CONST. art. 3,
§ 2.1.2, reprinted in 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL ("The institution shall administer its athletics
programs in accordance with the constitution, bylaws and other legislation of the Association.");
see also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988).
18. Since 1982, courts have consistently held that the NCAA is not a state actor and,
therefore, they have not afforded protection to those seeking to challenge the NCAA. See, e.g.,
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988);
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Wright, "[i]t is not judicial business to tell a voluntary athletic association
how best to formulate or enforce its rules."' 9 Such judicial deference to
the NCAA is untenable due to the sheer power of the NCAA. If courts
lack authority to review NCAA decisions, then student athletes are left
without recourse since they have no outside source to which they may
appeal. Even the schools themselves are powerless because an intercol-
legiate athletic association is nearly impossible to maintain without
membership in the NCAA. 20  Former University of Nevada, Las Vegas
basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian 2 commented, "[s]ometimes I feel the
NCAA is the only organization that's above the law."22
What rights will the NCAA be allowed to deny its members before
either the government or the legislature steps in to limit the NCAA's ever-
growing power?23 The NCAA may have finally crossed the line with its
rule 9-2, a rule which infringes upon student athletes' constitutional and
statutory rights to practice their religion freely. Rule 9-2 provides a clear
example of an athletic organization abusing its power.
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir.
1986); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602 (C.D. I11. 1987).
19. Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. "In order to operate a large-scale intercollegiate athletic program on an economically
sound basis, membership in the NCAA may be a practical necessity." Susan Westover, Note,
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: If NCAA Action Is Not State Action, Can
Its Members Meaningfully Air Their Dissatisfaction?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 966 n.78
(1989).
21. Tarkanian was involved in legal battles with the NCAA for well over a decade, winning
in Nevada's Supreme Court only to ultimately lose to the NCAA in the United States Supreme
Court. See Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
22. William F. Reed, Rebel Reprieve: In a Turnaround, the NCAA Lets UNLV Defend Its
Title, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 10, 1990, at 46, 49.
23. Four states (Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada) have enacted state statutes which
purport to protect their citizens from the power of the NCAA. The United States Supreme Court
struck down Nevada's statute holding that it violates the Commerce Clause. See Ronald J.
Thompson, Due Process and the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any
Constitutional Standards?, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1651, 1680-83 n.29 (1994).
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III. NCAA FOOTBALL RULE 9-2 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. The Adoption of Rule 9-2 and Its Impact
on Collegiate Football
Although the NCAA adopted rule 9-2 in 1992,24 the "no celebration
in the end zone" rule (as it is informally known) was decidedly absent from
the media until the 1995 football season. Prior to the 1995 season, football
officials were tolerant of many forms of celebration. Why the sudden
change?25  The NCAA Football rules Committee recently decided to
enforce the rule more strictly, in an effort to reduce "excessive celebra-
tions" on the field.26  Rule 9-2, entitled "Unsportsmanlike Conduct,"
focuses on the tenets of teamwork27 and attempts to eliminate unsports-
manlike taunting and showboating.28 The NCAA strives to prevent
players from drawing individual attention to themselves through such
actions as high-stepping across the end zone, dancing after a great play,
contacting or interacting with the fans in any manner, and demeaning or
taunting the opposing team.29 By choosing not to release a comprehensive
list of illegal conduct actionable under rule 9-2, the NCAA has left the rule
unabashedly vulnerable to misinterpretations and misapplications.
In a pre-season attempt to explain the "gray area" of the rule, the
Football Rules Committee and NCAA Productions created a video entitled
College Football: A Celebration of Teamwork.3" This video, as noted
above, was distributed to all NCAA member schools as well as to the
officials who promulgate and enforce the rules, so that every person
participating in NCAA football games was adequately familiar with the
rule. According to Vince Dooley, Chair of the Football Rules Committee,
"the goal here [in the video] is to provide definitive rulings on specific
24. Editorial, Touchdowns and Prayer, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL
10040353.
25. An online search of computerized news databases at the beginning of the football season
(Sept. 11, 1995) resulted in a list of well over two hundred newspaper articles written since July,
1995 discussing the NCAA football rule.
26. Falwell Throws the Penalty Flag at NCAA Ban of On-Field Prayer, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, at D2.
27. Rule 9-2, supra note 3. See also Videotape, supra note 4 (Vince Dooley, chair of the
Football Rules Committee states, "The Football Rules Committee has written rules to decide what
has a place in the game and what does not.").
28. NCAA Lets 'Ema Pray, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 3, 1995, available in 1995 WL 3155252.
29. Videotape, supra note 4.
30. Id.
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actions so that everyone involved in the game-players, coaches, officials,
and administrators-will have a clearer common understanding of what is
legal and what is illegal."'" Unfortunately, this video does little to lessen
the ambiguities created by rule 9-2. A particularly problematic section of
rule 9-2 is part (a)(1)(d),32 which is deliberately broad and general
"because the committee has concentrated on the intent of the actions, rather
than trying to itemize all of the things players can possibly do., 33 The
Rules Committee uses subsection (a)(1)(d) as a catch-all provision, allowing
the officials to throw a penalty flag for almost any noticeable conduct.3 4
The punishment for illegal conduct under rule 9-2 is a fifteen yard
penalty assessed on the next play.35 If such conduct occurs either during
a touchdown play or in celebration immediately following a score, the
touchdown will still count.36  However, the team in violation will be
assessed a fifteen yard penalty on the ensuing play, which is an attempt for
either one or two extra points, at the option of the team scoring the
touchdown. This penalty forces the team to reconsider its strategy, as both
plays, especially the two-point conversion, will become much more
difficult. As games often turn on a single point, the ramifications of this
penalty are significant. Should a team incur a penalty for "unsportsman-
like conduct" prior to the opening kickoff, the transgressing team will
receive a fifteen yard penalty at the start of the game. If the illegal conduct
occurs during any other play, the fifteen yards will be assessed from the
place at which the ball is whistled dead. In addition to the fifteen yard
penalty, any one player who is twice penalized for unsportsmanlike conduct
in a single game will be disqualified from that game.37 The penalty for
violating rule 9-2 is extremely severe and may substantially affect the result
of games.
31. Id.
32. Rule 9-2(a)(l)(d) states that an excessive or prolonged act by which a player attempts
to focus attention upon himself or herself will earn that player's team a fifteen yard penalty. Rule
9-2, supra note 3.
33. Videotape, supra note 4 (statement of John Adams, Secretary of the Rules Committee).
34. Videotape, supra note 4.
35. Rule 9-2, supra note 3.
36. Videotape, supra note 4.
37. Rule 9-2, supra note 3.
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B. Rule 9-2 Infringes upon First Amendment Rights by
Impinging on the Freedom to Exercise Religious Beliefs
One of the most debated controversies raised by rule 9-2 involves
rights protected by the First Amendment. The rule acts as a ban on
outward expressions of prayer and also imposes a limit on the free exercise
of speech. Apparently, this rule encompasses kneeling in prayer, at least
according to the NCAA's own video. A football player is shown kneeling
on one knee in the end zone after scoring a touchdown. 38 Although the
individual kneels for only a few seconds, this momentary time span is
apparently significant enough to constitute a delay under the rule.3 9 While
the image of the kneeling player is flashed upon the screen, a voice intones,
"[k]neeling, regardless of intent, is a form of posing and is a foul because
it focuses attention on one person at the expense of the rest of the team.
This action, or lack of action, is definitely delayed and prolonged. ' 40
The phrase "regardless of intent" indicates that the framers of the rule
considered the possible reasons a football player might kneel, and
determined that an all-inclusive rule was nonetheless appropriate. When a
player kneels and bows his head, he is not likely to be doing anything but
praying. By adopting and promulgating this rule, in effect, the NCAA has
unequivocally stated that prayer is not acceptable on the football field.
However, prayer and the freedom to practice one's religion may not be
banned, at least according to the framers of another set of rules-those who
created the United States Constitution. The Constitution expressly protects
religious freedom, a right that the NCAA is currently invading.
According to the video,4 ' a football player may not commit any act,
even one religious in nature, if such action draws individualized attention
to the player. 2 This rule inherently restricts a player's First Amendment
rights, including the free exercise of speech, and most specifically the free
exercise of religion. 3 The rule has a particularly chilling effect on
religious activities, due to the harshness of the penalties and the vagueness
of the rule. A player may choose to refrain from perfectly acceptable
conduct for fear that the action risks sanctions. As previously discussed,
38. Videotape, supra note 4.
39. Id.
40. Id. (statement of John Adams, Secretary of the Rules Committee).
41. Id.
42. Rule 9-2, supra note 3.
43. Although there is a substantial claim that rule 9-2 presents a significant burden on the
free exercise of speech, that argument is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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when rule 9-2 is violated, the penalties are extremely significant." For
example, pursuant to the NCAA's videotaped interpretation of rule 9-2, if
a player kneels at any point in the game and then later removes his helmet
as a sign of humility before God, that player will shortly find himself
sidelined-disqualified from the game for two counts of unsportsmanlike
conduct in the same game.45
Two members of the Rules Committee have gone so far as to publicly
explain that the rule prohibits kneeling in prayer anywhere in the stadium
except at the team bench area.46 Kneeling is banned on the field of play
as well as out of bounds.47 Rule 9-2 essentially prohibits each of the
following actions: kneeling to pray, genuflecting, pointing towards God or
heavenward, bowing the head in prayer, and pausing to pray silently on the
48field or sidelines.
Rule 9-2, as interpreted and applied by the NCAA and its agents,
invades a football player's constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion and speech as protected by the First Amendment.4 9 In addition,
the rule constitutes religious discrimination which violates the 1993
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.50 The rule is also an infraction of
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.5' Finally, a football player affected
by this rule may have a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since
the player has been deprived of federal rights by a person or persons acting
under color of state law.52
44. Rule 9-2, supra note 3.
45. Liberty Univ. v. NCAA, No. 95-0046-L, at 9-11 (W.D. Va. filed Aug. 31, 1995)
(dismissed Sept. 1, 1995).
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § I ("Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].").
50. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (b)(2) (1993). "The purposes
of this chapter are to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by the government." Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a states:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin (emphasis added).
52. See infra part V for the status of the NCAA as a state actor.
1996]
454 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
IV. AN IN-COURT CHALLENGE To RULE 9-2
A. Liberty University v. NCAA: A Cause of Action
Under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
On August 31, 1995, Liberty University ("Liberty"), founded by
television evangelist Jerry Falwell, filed suit in federal court in response to
the NCAA's interpretation of rule 9-2." Liberty football coach Sam
Rutigliano and four of his football players "asked a United States District
Court judge in Virginia to decide this question: Does the NCAA's new
unsportsmanlike conduct code restrict freedom of religion by penalizing
players who kneel in the end zone to celebrate a touchdown?"54 Liberty
sought a temporary restraining order, as well as a preliminary and
permanent injunction to prevent the NCAA and its agents from enforcing
rule 9-2 as it pertains to religious practices." Liberty premised its claim
upon violations of section 2000 of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
asserting that since the stadium was one of public accommodation, religious
discrimination is not allowed under section 2000 of the Title.1
6
Liberty argued that as the owner and operator of a football stadium
(a place of public accommodation under section 2000a (b)(3) of Title II),"
it cannot enforce NCAA rules which violate Title 11.58 Title II provides
that all persons are entitled "to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of [that]
place of public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of. . . religion." 9 A person may neither be deprived of,
53. Falwell Throws the Penalty Flag at NCAA Ban of On-Field Prayer, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, at D2.
54. Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Sued Over Ban on End Zone Prayers, Freedom of Religion
Violated, Falwell Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, § 4, at 7.
55. Liberty Univ. v. NCAA, No. 95-0046-L, at 17-18 (W.D.Va. filed Aug. 31, 1995)
(dismissed Sept. 1, 1995).
56. Id.
57. Section 2000a (b)(3) states:
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a
place of public accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter
if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation
by it is supported by State action:
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or enter-
tainment (emphasis added).
58. Liberty Univ, No. 95-0046-L, at 1.
59. Id. at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)).
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nor threatened or coerced with, nor punished for exercising the rights set
forth in section 2000a.' Hence, the NCAA, with its adoption of rule 9-2,
has significantly interfered with Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Liberty agreed to drop the lawsuit after the NCAA issued a "clarifica-
tion."' 6' The memo, which was released to all NCAA member schools and
officials, stated:
The committee is concerned about reports it has "banned
prayer" from football. It is not the intent of the Football Rules
Committee to prohibit prayer, on or off the playing field. The
committee is emphasizing an existing rule against acts that by
their timing or duration draw attention to an individual and
ignore the contributions of the entire team.
Praying has always been and remains permissible under the
rules. However, overt acts associated with prayer, such as
kneeling, may not be done in a way that is delayed, excessive,
or prolonged in an attempt to draw attention to oneself. Players
may pray or cross themselves inconspicuously without drawing
attention to themselves. It is also permissible for them to kneel
momentarily at the conclusion of a play, if in the judgment of
the official the act is spontaneous and not in the nature of a
pose.
In considering this issue, the committee decided that it
would be impracticable to construct an exclusion from the rule
for prayer-related activities. Such an exclusion would open a
window for a variety of attention-drawing displays under the
guise of prayer. Thus, the committee has taken a position
against the visible part of any action . . . that detracts from the
team spirit of football.62
A spokesperson for Liberty said that it decided to drop the suit because the
school achieved its goals, even though some sections of the clarified rule
"are still fairly subjective and leave some things up to interpretation. "63
On September 1, 1995, the United States District Court for the Western
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2.
61. Memorandum from Vince J. Dooley, NCAA management, to the members of the NCAA
[including Liberty University] (Sept. 1, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. David Reed, Gridiron Celebration: NCAA Rules Post-TD Prayers OK, PHOENIX
GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 1995, at A-I, A-6.
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District of Virginia entered a single sentence dismissal of Liberty University
v. NCAA. 64
The clarification by the NCAA has done very little, if anything, to
eliminate potential infringements of the First Amendment rights of a
college football player. A spokeswoman for the NCAA said "[t]here is no
change in the rule and there is no change in the enforcement. We [the
NCAA] clarified the rule and explained to them [Liberty] what the
interpretation has always been. '65  Despite the supposed clarification,
which changed nothing according to the NCAA, the exact "interpretation"
and application of the rule to religious practices remains unclear. The most
that the clarifying memorandum has accomplished is to firmly place the
decisions of what is and is not acceptable in the subjective hands of the
officials.
The NCAA clarification has essentially cast the officials as "spiritual
policemen. 66 In that role, the officials must ascertain not only the intent
of the player, but also the spontaneity of the action. How exactly should
an official determine the intent of the football player on one knee in the
end zone? Does a devout expression on the player's face indicate a pure
motive and spontaneous action? What standards are applicable in order for
the official to make the call? If a player points heavenward in thanks, but
the official believes that the player is pointing at an opponent in a taunting
manner, is it appropriate for the official to throw a penalty flag? The
answers to these questions will, of course, vary, depending upon who is
officiating. The spontaneity of the action as well as the player's intent can
only be determined subjectively by the official. What is spontaneous in the
eyes of one official will be an excessive celebration according to another;
undoubtedly someone will get it wrong. One journalist whimsically
suggested that instant replay may be the answer.67 One can only imagine
the reaction of the official who sees a player pointing to God in slow
motion. Even an attorney for the NCAA admitted that "[w]hen a person
kneels in the end zone, nobody but that person and God knows whether he
is praying or not .... [B]ut everyone is looking at him, and that is the
64. "In light of the attached submission from the NCAA, plaintiffs' pending TRO Motion
is declared to be moot." Liberty Univ. v. NCAA, No. 95-0046-L (W.D.Va. Sept. 1, 1995) (order
granting dismissal).
65. Reed, supra note 63.
66. David Casstevens, Welcome to Church of Football, ARIz. REPUB., Sept. 3, 1995, at Ci.
67. Geoffrey Arnold, Irish Loss Will Be Story of 1995, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 4,
1995, at D2.
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point., 6' Beyond merely discouraging religious expression, rule 9-2 is
unconstitutional. For even if only one official unfairly miscontrues a
player's intent, at that moment the NCAA should be flagged for violating
the player's right to freely exercise his religion.
B. Alternative Causes of Action Under Football
Rule 9-2, Despite the NCAA ' "Clarification"
Despite the dismissal of Liberty University v. NCAA, the legality of
rule 9-2 remains unresolved. Notably, the rule may violate the
constitutionally protected free exercise of religion and speech as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights.69 Liberty, however, did not raise these arguments
in its complaint because it wished to avoid the issue of whether the NCAA
is a state actor.70 In the well-known case NCAA v. Tarkanian,7' the
Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor. Nevertheless,
Liberty still had a reasonable chance to prevail, since the facts of Liberty's
suit were entirely different from those of the Tarkanian case.
Unfortunately, the NCAA has "put itself in the business of deciding
what kind [of demonstrations] of prayer [it is] going to allow."72  The
NCAA remains in that same business, regardless of the "clarifying"
memorandum. There are other causes of action under which a litigant
could file a lawsuit. These include causes of action under the First
Amendment to the Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
73
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act. The success of these
claims depends upon whether the NCAA will be declared a state actor.74
68. Liberty Is Free to Pray as NCAA Clarifies Rule, THE RECORD, N. NEW JERSEY, Sept.
2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 3478424.
69. Although a claim under the free speech clause of the First Amendment would provide
an interesting argument, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
70. Telephone Interview with Thomas S. Neuberger, lead counsel for Plaintiff, Liberty Univ.
(Sept. 15, 1995).
71. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
72. Liberty is Free to Pray as NCAA Clarifies Rule. supra note 68 (Thomas Neuberger,
speaking at the hearing before Judge Turk in the U.S. District Court for Western Virginia on Aug.
31, 1995).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
74. Consider also that the plaintiff (Liberty) was a private school, which actually weakens
the argument for state action, although it does not affect a claim brought under any of the Titles
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A state-supported school is clearly a state actor, so it would
seem that if a suit were to be filed against a state-supported school, the claim would succeed,
assuming the rights of the football player were deemed to be substantially burdened.
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V. STATE ACTION AND THE NCAA
A. Only a State Actor Is Liable for Violations
of Constitutional Rights
The NCAA must be engaged in state action and not just private
conduct to be held responsible for constitutional infringements.75
In order to establish a violation of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was a
state actor and that the challenged conduct resulted in impair-
ment of the plaintiff's free exercise of genuinely held beliefs.
76
In other words, the NCAA must be acting under "color of' state law
pursuant to section 1983. 77 Section 1983 was enacted by Congress as the
statutory remedy for constitutional violations.78 A cause of action under
section 1983 requires that an actor deprive the plaintiff of a federal right
under color of state law. 79 Those rights may be granted either statutorily,
such as under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, or in the Constitution,
such as the right to the free exercise of one's religion under the First
Amendment.8 ° Only a state actor is liable for any infringement upon the
rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.81 If the NCAA is
deemed a private actor, rather than an agent of the state, constitutional
challenges against it will fail.
As one might imagine, the NCAA has defended various lawsuits over
the years. The line of case law involving state action and the NCAA
culminated in the 1988 United States Supreme Court case, NCAA v.
75. Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 610 (C.D. Il1. 1987).
76. St. Agnes Hosp. of Baltimore v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 324 (D. Md. 1990) (citing
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
78. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. However, as for any private actor, the NCAA is subject to statutory restraints, such
as the Title VII prohibition on gender discrimination.
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Tarkanian 2 In a five-four decision, the Court held that the NCAA was
not a state actor, reversing the decision of the Nevada State Supreme
Court.83 This decision was a departure from several court decisions
holding that the NCAA is a state actor.
B. The NCAA as a State Actor Prior to
NCAA v. Tarkanian
During the 1970s, lower courts consistently held that the NCAA was
a state actor under section 1983.84  These cases contain persuasive
arguments for upholding the NCAA's status as a state actor.85 This line
of decisions, however, is no longer followed in light of Tarkanian.
Two leading cases from the 1970s that determined the NCAA is a
state actor are Parish v. NCAA8 6 and Howard University v. NCAA. 7 In
Parish, the Fifth Circuit found the NCAA to be a state actor based on two
premises.88 First, the court elaborated upon the notion that state-supported
institutions play a substantial role in the NCAA.89 The court concluded
that the substantial role of public universities merits a finding of state
action under an entanglement theory.90 In other words, the actions of the
NCAA and the public school were so entangled as to be deemed in-
separable. Second, the court reasoned that "the NCAA, by taking upon
itself the role of coordinator and overseer of collegiate athletics, ... is
82. Id.
83. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179. This decision has been severely criticized. See, e.g., N.E.
Paolini, NCAA v. Tarkanian: State Action in Collegiate Athletics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1703 (1989);
Bill McManus, Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: May a Student-Athlete Receive Constitutional
Protection from the NCAA's Actions or Has the Final Door Been Closed?., 57 UMKC L. REV.
949 (1989); Susan Westover, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: If
NCAA Action Is Not State Action. Can Its Members Meaningfully Air Their Dissatisfaction?, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1989); Michael G. Dawson, Note, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian: Supreme Court Upholds NCAA 's Private Status Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Repelling Shark's Attack on NCAA s Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 217
(1989).
84. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th
Cir. 1974); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
85. Dawson, supra note 83, at 227.
86. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 1032.
90. Id.
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performing a traditional government function."'" Subsequent to the Parish
decision, courts used either an entanglement theory or the traditional
government function theory to support a finding of the NCAA as a state
actor. These rationales are still meritorious today, despite contrary legal
trends.
Parish was followed three months later by Howard.92 Although the
Howard court primarily relied on the entanglement theory used in Parish,
it also articulated another factor used to determine state action.93 The
Howard court employed the rationale that at least half of the NCAA
member institutions were either public or otherwise supported by the
government. 94 As such, a substantial and pervasive entanglement existed
between the NCAA and its member schools who were supported by the
states-rendering the NCAA a state actor.95 Since the NCAA and its
members are engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship, the court found
that this relationship is "the type of symbiotic relationship between public
and private entities which triggers constitutional scrutiny. '96 Prior to
1982, courts found that the NCAA was a state actor based on the level of
entanglement, its traditional government function, or the symbiotic
relationship theories espoused by Parish, Howard, and other similar
cases.9 Courts have since reversed their determination that the NCAA is
a state actor, yet there has been no change whatsoever in the structure of
the athletic association. No new facts about the NCAA and its organization
justify the turnaround in the judicial system. Rather, courts have arbitrarily
decided that it is no longer appropriate for the NCAA to be held as a state
actor. However, since NCAA power over member institutions has
increased, these theories have not been convincingly discarded.
The reversal of the state action issue by the lower courts was triggered
by a 1982 trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Rendall-Baker v. Kohn,98
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company,99 and Blum v. Yaretsky.'00 The Court
91. Id. at 1032-33.
92. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
93. Id. at 219.
94. Id. See also Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d at 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S.
179 (1988) (citing Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 544 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir.
1977)).
95. Howard, 510 F.2d at 220.
96. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
97. See cases cited supra note 84.
98. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
99. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
100. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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discussed three distinct tests to determine whether a private organization is
a state actor. First, the complaining party must show a sufficient nexus
between the state and the private entity, such as a partner-like relation-
ship. ° Second, the state must have exercised significant encouragement
or coercive power over the private entity.02  Finally, the state may
delegate its authority to a private party, thereby rendering the private party
a state actor. 03 After these three cases, lower courts held that the NCAA
was merely a private actor.
An action arising under rule 9-2 meets the standard by which a private
party should be deemed a state actor as stated in Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil.1'4 The first prong of the two-part test requires that "the deprivation
must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible."' 0 5 The deprivation of the free exercise
of religion and the freedom of speech are caused by the exercise of a rule
of conduct (the football rule) imposed by the state (the school),'0 6 thereby
satisfying the first prong of the Lugar test. 0 7 The second prong of Lugar
requires that the party charged with the deprivation be a state actor.1
08
If the party charged is a state-supported school, then the second prong is
easily fulfilled.0 9 Even if the party charged is the NCAA, the second
prong has still been met because the NCAA has acted in conjunction with
an absolute state actor---the school." 0  This notion of the NCAA acting
101. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); see also Lugar, 457
U.S. at 937 (degree to which the activities of the state entity and the arguably private entity are
intertwined is also pertinent).
102. Alan Fecteau, NCAA State Action: Not Present When Regulating Intercollegiate
Athletics-But Does That Include Drug Testing Student Athletes?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
291, 295 (1995).
103. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195 (1988).
104. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
105. Id. at 937.
106. This particular argument is dependent upon the school being state-supported, which
equates the school to the state itself. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. As previously
mentioned, at least half of the NCAA member schools will satisfy this requirement. See infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
107. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
108. Id. The second prong of the Lugar test is:
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly said to be
a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State.
Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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in conjunction with the university is appropriate under the entanglement
and symbiotic relationship theories postulated by Parish and Howard.
Thus, the NCAA should be considered a state actor.
C. NCAA v. Tarkanian: Do Constitutional Claims
Against the NCAA Necessarily Fail?
Jerry Tarkanian became the head coach of the men's basketball
program at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas ("UNLV") in 1973.'
In 1987, UNLV informed Tarkanian that he was going to be suspended
because of an NCAA report which detailed ten violations of NCAA rules
committed by the coach. 12 UNLV was forced to either sever all ties
with Jerry Tarkanian or face further penalties imposed by the NCAA.
UNLV, however, was not dissatisfied with Tarkanian as coach and appealed
to the NCAA Council, questioning the factual basis of the charges.'
Ultimately, UNLV's President felt that he had no choice other than to
"[r]ecognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act
as ultimate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his
present position--though tenured and without adequate notice-even while
believing that the NCAA was wrong."" 4
According to the majority decision in Tarkanian, any claims against
the NCAA alleging a violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights will fail
in court because the NCAA is not a state actor. However, Tarkanian does
not necessarily preclude a college football player from successfully
challenging the NCAA's Football rule 9-2 as unconstitutional.
Although it may be difficult to label the NCAA a state actor following
Tarkanian, a state-supported college or university is unquestionably a state
actor. When a school enforces the rules of the NCAA, as it must do to
maintain intercollegiate athletics, that institution adopts the rules as its own.
Therefore, when incorporated into the athletic program of a public school,
rule 9-2 becomes part of state law. There is decidedly state action once the
school enforces the rule in any manner. The school may now properly be
sued for violating constitutionally guaranteed rights. The NCAA is, in
effect, coercing schools "to permit and sanction a discriminatory regime of
rules" 5 which violates the Constitution. The NCAA cannot and should
111. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1988).
112. Id. at 181.
113. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
114. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 187.
115. Liberty Univ. v. NCAA, No. 95-0046-L, at I (W.D. Va. filed Aug. 31, 1995) (dismissed
Sept. 1, 1995).
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not expect colleges and universities to infringe upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights. 116
In determining whether a constitutional claim against the NCAA and
a university will succeed, the first issue to be resolved is whether the
university is a state actor. In Tarkanian, the Supreme Court first examined
UNLV as a state actor before any analysis of the NCAA's status." 7 "In
the typical case raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the
decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is
whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct
as state action.""' 8 Undoubtedly, UNLV, a state university supported by
the state of Nevada, is a state actor."9 The second and key issue is
whether the NCAA was also rendered a state actor due to UNLV's
compliance with rules and regulations established by the athletic or-
ganization. 2  According to the Court, a private party may be deemed a
state actor if it is found that (1) the state delegated its power to the private
party,' 2' or (2) the two parties are joint participants.
22
A state's delegation of power or authority to a private actor converts
the private party into a state actor. 23 In Tarkanian, the Court found that
"UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take specific action."'1
24
However, a potential lawsuit involving rule 9-2 would mandate an opposite
result. Clearly, the NCAA's member institutions have delegated their
authority to the NCAA in the regulation of football games. In addition, the
NCAA could only enforce its decision to suspend Coach Tarkanian by
imposing sanctions on UNLV.'25  The NCAA could not directly dis-
cipline Coach Tarkanian. 26  The NCAA is abusing its power over
member schools by forcing these schools to violate the rights of players.
The NCAA, via its officials, directly disiplines football players. Rule 9-2
dictates that the NCAA can impose sanctions on a football player through
116. Granted, this same line of reasoning is not applicable to a private school, but since the
NCAA is comprised of both public and private schools, the rules must be uniform for all involved
parties.
117. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 193.
121. Id. at 192.
122. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196 n.16.
123. Id. at 195.
124. Id. at 195-96.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 197.
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its delegation of power to the state university in order to govern the
football games. Therefore, Tarkanian can be distinguished.
The Tarkanian Court also relied heavily upon the argument that the
NCAA and UNLV were not acting as joint participants, but rather as
adversaries.127 In fact, "the NCAA contended that [UNLV] should be
realigned as plaintiffs because they actually wanted Tarkanian to
prevail."' 128 If the two actors were joint .participants, then it is likely that
the NCAA would be considered a state actor under an entanglement theory,
as both parties stand to gain a "variety of mutual benefits."' 129 In regulat-
ing college football games, the university and the NCAA both derive
benefits. As such, the NCAA should be deemed a state actor under an
entanglement theory and thus be liable if constitutional rights have been
violated.
The Tarkanian decision provides a difficult, though not insurmount-
able, obstacle to determining that the NCAA is a state actor. The NCAA
does not have complete immunity from the finding that it is indeed a state
actor. Each lawsuit will continue to be addressed on a case-by-case basis,
depending not only on the differing facts, but also on the various legal
issues presented. 3° The NCAA's infringement on religious freedom is
a case of first impression. Because the state school has delegated power
to the NCAA, the state and the school are certainly joint participants, not
adversaries as in Tarkanian. In an action challenging rule 9-2, it is entirely
probable that a court will deem the NCAA a state actor liable for the
purposes of the lawsuit and will allow the substantive violations to be
litigated.
D. Justice White's Dissent in NCAA v. Tarkanian
In Tarkanian, Justice White premised his dissent on the entanglement
theory.' 3' He relied upon Dennis v. Sparks, 32 which held that private
parties could be found to be state actors if they were "jointly engaged with
state officials in the challenged action." 133  White believed that the
NCAA and UNLV were clearly joint actors, which necessarily deemed the
127. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196.
128. Id. at 189.
129. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
130. See generally Aidan Middlemiss McCormack, Seeking Procedural Due Process in
NCAA Infraction Procedures: States Take Action, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 261 (1992).
131. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 202.
132. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
133. Id. at 27-28.
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NCAA a state actor. 1 4 White also disagreed with the majority rationale
that since the NCAA and UNLV were adversaries, they could not be acting
jointly.'35 In his disagreement, White continued to rely on the premise
of Dennis, which is simply that the joint agreement of the two parties to
take action is sufficient to render the private actor an actor of the state.'36
The line of demarcation as to what constitutes state action is far from
clear. White's dissent demonstrates the ease with which facts can be used
to support either side of the argument.
The Court's rejection of Dennis, apparently a controlling
opinion, appears to indicate that the Court is indecisive as to
where the line is to be drawn between private conduct and state
action. As a result, the Court may be shifting toward deciding
state action cases on an ad hoc basis.
37
E. Rationales for Determining That the NCAA Is a State Actor:
The Decision of the Nevada State Supreme Court
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Tarkanian v. NCAA, found that the
actions of the NCAA were sufficient to merit state action. 13 The NCAA
became a state actor through its joint participation with UNLV 3 9 "By
delegating authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by
imposing NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the
NCAA." 140 The Nevada court also held that the deprivation of the right
alleged by Tarkanian was in fact one created by the state.' 4' Because the
NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law, the NCAA was required to
grant due process to coach Tarkanian before engaging in any disciplinary
action. 42 To determine that the NCAA was a state actor, the Nevada
Supreme Court relied upon the delegation of authority from UNLV to the
NCAA. 143  This rationale supports an action based on rule 9-2, since
134. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 202.
135. Id. at 203.
136. Id.
137. Bill McManus, Note, NCAA v. Tarkanian: May a Student-Athlete Receive
Constitutional Protection from the NCAA "s Actions or Has the Final Door Been Closed?, 57
UMKC L. REV. 949, 961 (1989).
138. 741 P.2d at 1345, 1349 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1350.
143. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d at 1348-49.
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universities have clearly delegated their power to regulate football games
to the NCAA.
VI. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
A CHALLENGE TO RULE 9-2
Until recently, all free exercise claims arising under the First
Amendment were subject to strict scrutiny.'" Under this standard of
review, the plaintiff must prove that the state rule or regulation burdens
religious practice. 45  The state must then demonstrate a compelling
interest, and further justify the infringement by showing that the rule is the
least restrictive means of achieving its interest. 46 If the state meets this
burden, the rule or regulation will be upheld.
Courts also apply a strict scrutiny standard to laws of general
applicability that either indirectly affect or directly burden the exercise of
religion. 47  Rule 9-2 may, at first, appear to be a law of general
applicability--a rule not targeted at religion but rather one that has the
effect of burdening religious practices-but upon closer inspection, and
following the example set forth in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah,'48 rule 9-2 no longer seems even facially neutral. According
to Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, if the object of a law is to restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, then the law is simply not
neutral. 4 9  Rule 9-2 expressly prohibits kneeling on the football field
"regardless of intent."'"5  A player on bended knee in the end zone is
clearly praying, and yet the rule bans this activity. Rule 9-2 thus forbids
a common religious practice.
The Football Rules Committee apparently debated at length whether
prayer in the end zone should be allowed. The Committee chair said,
"[w]e decided that in the final analysis that that would fall under any
delayed, excessive or prolonged act in which a player attempts to focus
attention on himself."' 5' Obviously, the NCAA was well aware of the
impending ban on religious freedom when drafting the rule. When a law
144. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
145. St. Agnes Hosp. of Baltimore v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 329 (D. Md. 1990).
146. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
147. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
148. 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993).
149. Id.
150. Videotape, supra note 4.
151. Andrew Bagnato, NCAA Sued Over Ban on End Zone Prayers, Freedom of Religion
Violated, Falwell Says, Cmi. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1995, § 4, at 7.
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regulates or prohibits conduct motivated by religious reasons, then the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered.'52 The NCAA is
explicitly prohibiting religiously motivated conduct with a rule that is
discriminatory on its face. As such, judicial scrutiny of the NCAA's
football rule must be strict.
If, on the other hand, rule 9-2 is deemed even facially neutral, then
it presents a case comparable to Sherbert v. Verner.' In Sherbert, the
Supreme Court employed strict scrutiny to overturn a facially neutral
unemployment law even though it applied to all citizens equally.'54 The
plaintiff was fired after refusing to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath.
Because she "chose" not to work on those days, the law prevented the
plaintiff from receiving unemployment benefits.' Although the law was
not intended to discriminate against her religion, or any other religion, the
Court found that this law substantially and unlawftilly burdened the
plaintiff's practice of religion.'56 Since the state did not prove a compel-
ling state interest, the statute was overturned.'57 Likewise, rule 9-2
clearly restricts a player's right to freely exercise his or her religion. Even
if this discrimination is not explicitly written on the face of the statute, rule
9-2 burdens religious practices. When adjudicating this issue, the rationale
of Sherbert invalidates the NCAA application of rule 9-2.
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' 58 despite the state's compulsory
education laws requiring all children to attend high school, Amish parents
were granted a special privilege to withdraw their children from school
after the completion of eighth grade. 59  According to Amish beliefs,
mandatory secular education would undermine the religious values and
salvation of the Amish community.' 6' The Court examined the state's
compelling interest in universal compulsory education, and decided that the
interest was not substantially thwarted, which was therefore insufficient to
justify burdening the religious practices of the Amish.'6 ' Although the
state law was one of general applicability and no particular religion was
targeted, the Court again applied strict scrutiny, and the law was rendered
152. Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
153. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
154. Id. at 410.
155. Id. at 404.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 410.
158. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
159. Id. at 234.
160. Id. at 234-35.
161. Id. at 228-29.
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unconstitutional. 61  The NCAA's goal of reducing unsportsmanlike
conduct does not rise to the level of importance of maintaing the sanctity
of the First Amendment. Much like the statute in Yoder, rule 9-2 must be
re-examined.
Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, 63 the Court applied the
strictest judicial scrutiny and granted extensive protection to religious
freedoms.' 6 Laws were not upheld unless they were the least restrictive
means of attaining a compelling state interest. 65  With the five-four
decision of Smith, the Court dramatically reduced free exercise protections
by advocating a less severe rational basis test to claims under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when such claims involve
generally applicable laws. 166 In Smith, the United States Supreme Court
denied an exemption from Oregon's drug laws for the religious use of
peyote by two members of the Native American Church. 167  The Court
decided that the strict scrutiny standard would no longer be used in most
cases to examine the constitutionality of a law of general applicability
under the Free Exercise Clause, regardless of that law's impact on religious
practices.
68
Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause did not afford religiously
motivated actors any special exemptions from the reach of laws of general
applicability. 69 Under Smith, if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not
the object of the law in question but merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable provision, no violation of the First Amendment
occurs. 7 According to the Court, laws of general applicability that
adversely affect religiously motivated conduct are "subject to neither more
nor less judicial scrutiny than laws that adversely affect conduct of a
nonreligious nature."' 7' The rational basis test, the least stringent level
of scrutiny, requires only that a law be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 72  States need only demonstrate a rational basis for the
162. Id. at 234.
163. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
164. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
165. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
166. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 884-85.
169. Id. at 878-79.
170. Id.
171. Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment Division
v. Smith and The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 135 (1994).
172. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (holding that a
legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state
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challenged law, rather than a compelling state interest, as required under
the rigorous strict scrutiny standard. Smith thus destroyed the doctrine of
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for laws of general
applicability, allowing a much looser standard of rational basis to
prevail.'
'Much like the reaction to the Tarkanian decision, the response to
Smith has been highly critical and extremely negative. 74  The decision
embodied the sentiment that every American has a right to believe in any
religion, but no right to practice it.'75 A large number of law professors,
as well as many religious and other public interest groups, collectively
petitioned the Supreme Court for a rehearing. 76 When the petition was
denied, a legislative approach was initiated. Congressman Stephen Solarz
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives purporting to restore
religious liberty. 17 7 Congress ultimately adopted H.R. 5377, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.178 Interestingly, the Smith Court
tacitly suggested that the proper place to seek protection for religious
beliefs is in the legislature.'
79
purpose).
173. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
174. See, e.g., Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Religion Clause: A Double Guarantee of
Religious Liberty, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 189 (1993); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221 (1993); John T. Noonan, Jr., The End of Free
Exercise?, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 567 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Rehnquist
Court's Free Exercise Collision on the Peyote Road, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 315 (1993); Randy T.
Austin, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: A Giant Step Backwards in Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1331 (1991); Rashelle Perry, Note, Employment Division
v. Smith: A Hallucinogenic Treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 359
(1991).
175. Douglas Laycock, New Directions in Religious Liberty, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221 (1993); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that while religious beliefs and opinions are free from governmental
interference, religious conduct is not within the protection of the First Amendment; the Smith
Court relies on this decision, notwithstanding Cantwell); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (abandoning the Reynolds holding that religious conduct lacks First
Amendment protection).
176. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
177. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
179. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
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VII. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993
A. The Enactment of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was signed into
law on November 16, 1993, by President Clinton. 80 RFRA was enacted
specifically to restore the protection that the Supreme Court eliminated with
the Smith decision. 81 "The RFRA was expressly designed to return free
exercise claims to their perceived legal status prior to Smith, that is, to
affirm the doctrinal legitimacy of Sherbert and Yoder.... 182
RFRA purports to re-establish religious liberty in the United States by
extending greater protections to the exercise of religion. In passing RFRA,
Congress asserts that both laws of general applicability as well as those
which directly discriminate can burden the practice of religion. 83 RFRA
reaffirms the rationale of the framers of the Constitution who recognized
that the free exercise of religion is an unalienable right.' 84 In an effort
to restore the constitutional safeguard surrounding people's rights to freely
practice their religion, RFRA establishes a statutory version of the Free
Exercise Clause.'85 RFRA does not favor one religion over another, nor
does it advantage minority religions. 86 Rather, RFRA enacts a universal
standard by restoring the compelling interest test.
Congress, in passing this bill, became a clear proponent of applying
strict scrutiny.8 7 Under RFRA, government action that "substantially
180. Leon F. Szetpycki & Jean B. Arnold, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 88 EDUC. L.
REP. 907 (1994).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. RFRA provides:
The purposes of this Chapter are to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
Id.
182. Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment Division
v. Smith and The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 136-37
(1994).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1).
185. Laycock, supra note 175, at 235.
186. Id.
187. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 897 (1994).
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burdens religious exercise" is forbidden in the absence of a compelling
state interest. 8 8  Even if a compelling state interest exists, the burden
shifts to the state to prove that the challenged law is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest. RFRA restores the standard promulgated
in Sherbert, with one important difference. In Sherbert, any burden on the
exercise of religion, even one that was incidental, was sufficient to trigger
strict scrutiny. Under RFRA, a "substantial" burden is required, which
obviously presents a more difficult criterion to satisfy. There is no way to
predict exactly what will survive the standard established by the "substan-
tial burden" requirement. For now, the assessment will proceed on a case-
by-case basis.
B. Asserting a Claim Opposing Rule 9-2 Under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for Violations
of the First Amendment ' Free Exercise Clause
A simultaneous examination of Smith and RFRA leads to the
conclusion that litigation premised upon infringements of religious liberty
will no longer be asserted under the Constitution. Rather, the principal
federal claim will be statutory.'89 RFRA creates an independent statutory
right preserving the free exercise of religion that is broader than the Smith
Court's interpretation of the same right in the Constitution. 9  Strict
scrutiny will no longer apply to cases brought under the Free Exercise
Clause, except in certain circumstances. 9' This standard applies only to
claims premised on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.' 92 RFRA
provides a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding to a person whose
practice of a religion has been burdened, and allows that person to obtain
appropriate relief against the government. 93 "Government" is broadly
defined to include any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and
official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a
State, or a subdivision of a State."' 94  Clearly, a football player has a
right to practice his religion as he sees fit, and notwithstanding the NCAA,
188. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb.
189. Id. See also Laycock, supra note 187.
190. Szetpycki and Arnold, supra note 180, at 912.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. John W. Whitehead & Alexis I. Crow, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Implications for Religiously-Based Civil Disobedience and Free Exercise Claims, 33 WASHBURN
L.J. 383, 391 (1994).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2)(1).
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will have a valid claim under RFRA. Rule 9-2, whether a rule of general
applicability or one specifically targeting religious practices, is imposed by
the NCAA, acting under color of state law, and clearly burdens the free
exercise of religion. Those individuals who wish to pray following a great
football play may be prevented from doing so if, in the eyes of the official,
the act is delayed, prolonged or intended to call attention to the player.'95
The rule bans a player from removing his helmet at any time, even if such
removal is done in deference to God or a higher being. 96 Although the
unsportsmanlike conduct rule may not be construed as targeting religion,
by preventing a player from kneeling in thanks, the rule has unduly
burdened the free exercise of religion.
So, in the hypothetical action by the football player, if the case were
brought under the text of the Free Exercise Clause, the Smith precedent
would have to be followed. The player would likely claim that rule 9-2
unduly burdens the practice of his religion. Under Smith, the state and the
NCAA would only have to show a rational basis to uphold the rule, even
if the rule is found to be one of general applicability. The state and the
NCAA would merely have to prove that the Football Rules Committee
could reasonably have believed that rule 9-2 would eliminate unsportsman-
like conduct. This standard, of course, essentially means that rule 9-2 will
most likely be upheld and the player's claim will fail.
If, on the other hand, the player sues under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the same rule, even if it is one of general applicability,
will be subjected to different standards. The football player will have to
prove that the burden on his religious practices is a substantial one under
the language of the statute. Due to the very recent enactment of RFRA,
there is no precedent that might shed light on a judicial interpretation of
this requirement. Thus, the player may be able to establish that being
precluded from kneeling in the end zone or removing his helmet is a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion. If the player satisfies this
requirement, the burden will then shift to the state and the NCAA to
demonstrate a compelling interest in retaining the rule. If the state and the
NCAA cannot demonstrate a compelling interest, or fail to show that this
rule is the least restrictive means by which that interest can be achieved and
that no neutral rule could accomplish the same objective, the rule will be
invalidated; the player will win.
195. Rule 9-2, supra note 3, § 2(a)(1)(d).
196. Id. § 2(a)(l)(e).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Rule 9-2 will most certainly cause not only a fairness debate among
football aficionados, but also a legitimacy discussion throughout the legal
community. More than at any other time in its history, the NCAA will be
on trial. The legal battles and judicial decisions will provide a framework
upon which future NCAA regulations and other laws affecting religion will
be based. A plaintiff interested in overturning rule 9-2 should premise his
or her claim on Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and the First Amendment of the Constitution.
However, even if the action relies on the precedent of Smith, the way rule
9-2 is written, has been interpreted, and the subjectivity involved in those
interpretations will lead to its inevitable destruction. Certainly this time the
NCAA has exceeded its mandate and will face constitutional ramifications.
Amanda N. Luftman"
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